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Abstract 
The expansion of regionalism has spawned an extensive theoretical literature analysing 
the effects of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) on trade flows. In this paper we focus on 
FTAs (also called European agreements) between the European Union (EU-15) and the 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC-4, i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania) and model their effects on trade flows by treating the agreement variable as 
endogenous. Our theoretical framework is the gravity model, and the econometric 
method used to isolate and eliminate the potential endogeneity bias of the agreement 
variable is the fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD) technique. Our estimation 
results indicate a positive and significant impact of FTAs on trade flows. However, 
exports and imports are affected differently, leading to some disparity in trade flow 
performance between countries. Therefore, there is an asymmetric impact on the trade 
balance, the agreement variable resulting in a trade balance deficit in the CEEC. 
Keywords: Regionalisation, European integration, Panel data methods. 
JEL Classification: E61, F13, F15, C25.  
 
Corresponding author: Professor Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Centre for Empirical 
Finance, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK. Tel.: +44 (0)1895 
266713. Fax: +44 (0)1895 269770. Email: Guglielmo-Maria.Caporale@brunel.ac.uk
 1
 
1. Introduction 
 
Following the new wave of regionalisation in the eighties, regional integration has again 
been extensively investigated both in the theoretical and empirical literature. Recent 
analyses are based on Viner’s (1950) framework but also include theoretical ideas from 
the new trade theory and economic geography, being concerned with the impact of 
integration on global welfare. The innovation compared to the first wave studies consists 
in taking into account the dynamic effects of geographical size, non-economic gains, 
industrial localisation, and economies of scale.  
 
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) to 27 countries which was proposed during 
the nineties was unprecedented in terms of the number of countries and the changes 
which were implied, hence representing a challenge for both EU member countries and 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). It was a very important development for 
the future of the European continent. From a political point of view, it ensured stability 
after the troubled years of the Cold War. From an economic point of view, because of the 
size and the population of the countries involved and the development gap relative to the 
EU, the transition towards a market economy has not been without difficulties for the 
CEEC.  
 
There exists already an extensive literature analyzing the effects of regional free trade 
agreements (FTAs) on trade flows and stressing the role of regionalisation. However, the 
evidence is mixed. Most studies assume that the FTA formation (i.e. the choice of partner 
countries) is exogenous, but some papers highlight the potential endogeneity bias in 
estimating the effects of FTAs on trade volumes (Magee, 2003; Baier and Bergstrand, 
2004). Regional agreements require the assent of two governments. According to 
Grossman and Helpman (1995) a FTA assumes a relative balance in the potential trade 
between the partner countries.  
 
In this paper we focus on association agreements between four Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEEC-4, i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania) and 
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European Union member states (EU-15, i.e. Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Denmark, 
England, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Italy,  Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden) in the context of EU enlargement towards the East.  Our econometric analysis is 
based on the gravity model and tries to determine the effects of association agreements on 
trade flows treating FTAs as endogenous. We are particularly interested in whether such 
European agreements have increased trade flows between their members and, if so, by 
how much and how; in particular, we investigate whether their impact is symmetric or 
not. To address these issues, we examine the links between exports and imports volume 
introducing a dummy variable which represents the association agreement. Further, we 
use panel data techniques to isolate and eliminate the potential endogeneity bias of the 
agreement variable.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 3 we discuss briefly 
European agreements and the issue of endogeneity in regional agreements. In Section 3 
we outline the theoretical framework, i.e. the gravity model. In sections 4 we discuss 
alternative econometric methods to estimate gravity models, whilst the empirical analysis 
is presented in Section 5. Section 6 summarises the main findings and offers some 
concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. European Agreements and the Endogeneity Issue 
 
EU enlargement is not a new phenomenon, as the EU has already been enlarged several 
times since its creation: the year 1973 marked the accession of Denmark, the United 
Kingdom and Ireland; 1981, of Greece; 1986, of Spain and Portugal; 1995, of Austria, 
Sweden and Finland. However, EU enlargement towards the East is different both 
politically and economically, as it is the first time that countries belonging to the old 
communist bloc have applied for EU membership, and on this occasion integration has 
increased by as much as a third the EU population and territory (and to a lesser extent its 
wealth). 
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The EU proposed two basic strategic objectives for enlargement. Firstly, the creation of a 
Europe which guarantees peace, stability, democracy and respect of the human rights of 
minorities. Secondly, the creation of an open and competitive market able to improve the 
standard of living in the CEEC, gradually achieving real convergence. As a first step, in 
the early nineties all candidate countries signed bilateral “European Agreements” or 
“Association Agreements” with the EU creating preferential trade relationships.1 These 
included a time schedule for trade liberalisation between the signatories, with the EU 
agreeing to reduce barriers more quickly than the CEEC. However, initially tariff and 
non-tariff barriers were not dismantled for sensitive sectors such as agriculture and 
textiles. 
 
The expansion of regionalism has spawned an extensive literature on the effects of FTAs 
on trade flows and the choice of countries to form a preferential trade agreement. This 
literature provides some motivations based on welfare-enhancing and political arguments 
to explain association agreements. Since Viner (1950) most studies have analysed the 
welfare gains or losses from FTAs for member countries. FTAs have a positive impact on 
welfare if trade creation exceeds trade diversion. Factors accounting for the probability 
that two countries sign a regional agreement can be divided in three groups: (i) geography 
factors, (ii) intra-industry trade determinants, (iii) inter-industry trade determinants. In 
brief, two countries are more likely to sign an agreement if they are closer 
geographically, similar in size and differ in terms of factor endowment ratios: 
 
i) The net welfare gain is higher the closer the two countries are, because of trade 
creation. Several studies (see Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1996; Frankel and Wei, 1998) 
include geographical proximity in their analysis of a FTA formation. The rationale is the 
existence of transport costs (Helpman and Krugman, 1985), leading to the concept of 
"natural trade partners" based on geographical distance. Krugman (1991b) shows that in 
the case of agreements between geographically close countries trade creation is sizable 
(see also Wonnacot and Lutz, 1989), but the concept of “natural” partners has attracted 
                                                 
1 Hungary (1991), Poland (1991), Romania (1993), Czech Republic (1993), Slovakia (1993), Bulgaria 
(1993), Latvia (1995), Estonia (1995), Lithuania (1995), Slovenia (1995). 
 4
criticism, on the grounds that geographical proximity and initially high trade volumes do 
not necessarily ensure trade creation (see Bhagwati and Panagaryia, 1996). 
 (ii) The larger and more similar in economic size the two countries signing a trade 
agreement are, the higher the welfare gains from trade creation, which are achieved by 
exploiting economies of scale in the presence of differentiated products. 
(iii) The greater the difference in endowment ratios between two countries, the higher 
 the potential welfare gains from trade creation reflecting traditional comparative 
advantages.  
 
Consequently, countries which sign a regional agreement tend to have similar economic 
characteristics, which leads to trade creation and welfare gains. 
 
Non-economic objectives can also be behind regional agreements (Johnson 1965b, 
Cooper and Massell (1965), Wonnacott and Lutz, 1989, Magee, 2003, Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2004). In particular, better political decision-making, a guarantee of policy 
irreversibility, and bigger negotiating power with third parties could also explain such 
agreements (especially when the agreement takes the form of a customs union with a 
common exterior tariff – see Schiff and Winters, 1998). Also, democratic countries are 
more interested in consumers’ welfare and more likely to sign agreements with other 
democratic partners. Further, De Melo et al. (1993) showed that regional agreements 
make the implementation of policies more effective owing to a dilution effect of 
preferences: the lobby capacity of interest groups is lower in a regional as opposed ot 
national framework. Finally, such agreements make domestic policy reforms irreversible 
(Fernandez et Portes, 1998). 
 
The first empirical studies analysing the trade effects of a FTA included a FTA dummy 
variable in a gravity model.  Most of them treated FTA formation (choice of partner 
countries) as exogenous. The evidence was mixed. For instance, some studies found a 
significant impact of EC (European Community) agreements on trade flows between 
members (Aitken, 1973), whilst others concluded that this effect was insignificant 
(Bergstrand, 1985) or even negative (Frankel, 1997). This highlighted the potential 
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endogeneity bias affecting the preferential agreement variable, and subsequently a few 
studies tried to address the endogeneity issue by considering the role of economic factors, 
democratic freedom, and transport costs in the decision to conclude a regional agreement. 
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found that pairs of countries that sign an agreement tend to 
share common economic characteristics, which results in net trade creation and welfare 
growth. Magee (2003) measured the effects of preferential agreements on trade volumes 
treating FTAs as endogenous, estimating a system of simultaneous equations with 2SLS. 
He found that it is likely that two countries will sign an agreement if they are closer 
geographically, are similar in size and are both democracies. 
 
Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) tried to test the robustness of the regional agreement effect by 
using cross-section data. They concluded that its effect may be over- or underestimated 
owing to the potential endogeneity of this variable. These findings were confirmed by 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007), who pointed out that the regional agreement variable is not 
exogenous and the estimation of a gravity model using cross-section data for 
investigating the quantitative effect of this variable on trade flows can be biased because 
of unobservable heterogeneity or/and omitted variables. The bias resulting from not 
considering this variable as endogenous is an important issue; it can be the consequence 
of omitted variables that can be correlated with the regional agreement variable. Panel 
data (fixed effects) methods were shown to be suitable to take endogeneity into account.  
 
3. Trade Flow Effects of FTAs: The Gravity Model 
 
Our theoretical framework to examine the trade flows effects of FTAs (treating 
association agreements as endogenous) is the gravity model 2, in which trade flows from 
country i to country j are a function of the supply of the exporter country and of the 
demand of the importer country and trade barriers. In other words, national incomes of 
two countries, transport costs (transaction costs) and regional agreements are the basic 
determinants of trade.  
                                                 
2 The popularity of the gravity model is highlighted by Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) who consider it “the 
workhorse for empirical studies of regional integration”. 
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 Initially inspired by Newton’s gravity law, gravity models have become essential tools in 
the analysis of the effects of regional agreements on trade flows. The first applications 
were rather intuitive, without great theoretical claims. These included the contributions of 
Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963). But these studies were criticised for their lack of 
robust theoretical foundations. Subsequently, new international trade theory provided 
theoretical justifications for these models in terms of increasing returns of scale, 
imperfect competition and geography (transport costs).  
 
Linnemann (1966) proposed a gravity model derived from a Walrasian, general 
equilibrium model. He explained exports of country i to country j in terms of the 
interaction of three factors: potential supply of exports of country i, potential demand of 
imports from the country j and a factor representing trade barriers. Potential export 
supply is a positive function of the exporting country’s income level and can also be 
interpreted as a proxy for product variety. Potential import demand is a positive function 
of the importing country’s income level. Barriers to trade are a negative function of trade 
costs, transport costs, tariffs. The model takes the following form: 
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where Y represents country income, N represents the population, D is the geographical 
distance and Pk includes dummy variables. Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985) and 
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where Xij represents exports of country i to country j, β0 is the intercept, Yi and Yj are the 
GDP of country i and j respectively, (Yi /Ni) and (Yj /Nj ) stand for GDP per capita of 
country i and j respectively, Dij represents the geographical distance between the 
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economic centers of two partners, Pkij stands for other variables such as common 
language and historical bonds. 
 
4. Econometric Issues  
 
The regionalism issue was most frequently examined using a gravity model including a 
dummy variable for regional agreements3. Most studies estimating a gravity model 
applied the ordinary least square (OLS) method to cross-section data. Recently several 
papers have argued that standard cross-section methods lead to biased results because 
they do not account for heterogeneity. For instance, the impact of historical, cultural and 
linguistic links on trade flows is difficult to quantify. On the other hand, the potential 
sources of endogeneity bias in gravity model estimations fall under three categories: 
omitted variables, simultaneity, and measurement error (see Wooldrige, 2002). 
 
Matyas (1997) points out that the cross-section approach is affected by misspecification 
and suggests that the gravity model should be specified as a “three – way model” with 
exporter, importer and time effects (random or fixed ones). Egger (2000) argues that 
panel data methods are the most appropriate for disentangling time-invariant and country- 
specific effects. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) underline that the omission of specific 
effects for country pairs can bias the estimated coefficients. An alternative solution is to 
use an estimator to control bilateral specific effects as in a fixed effect model (FEM) or in 
a random effect model (REM). The advantage of the former is that it allows for 
unobserved or misspecified factors that simultaneously explain the trade volume between 
two countries and lead to unbiased and efficient results4. The choice of the method (FEM 
or REM) is determined by economic and econometric considerations. From an economic 
point of view, there are unobservable time-invariant random variables, difficult to be 
quantified, which may simultaneously influence some explanatory variables and trade 
volume. From an econometric point of view, the inclusion of fixed effects is preferable to 
random effects because the rejection of the null assumption of no correlation between the 
                                                 
3 Baldwin (1994),  Frankel (1997), Soloaga et Winters (2001), Glick et Rose (2002),  Carrere  (2006). 
4 Egger (2000), Egger (2002) 
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unobservable characteristics and explanatory variables is less plausible (see Baier and 
Bergstrand 2007).  
 
Another method which has gained considerable acceptance among economists (see Egger 
and Pfaffermayr, 2004) is the Hausman-Taylor's panel one incorporating time-invariant 
variables correlated with bilateral specific effects (see, for instance, Hausman-Taylor, 
1981; Wooldrige, 2002; Hsiao, 2003). Plümper and Troeger (2004) have proposed a more 
efficient method called “the fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD)” to accommodate 
time-invariant variables. Using Monte Carlo simulations they compared the performance 
of the FEVD method to some other existing techniques, such as the fixed effects, or 
random effects, or Hausman-Taylor method. Their results indicate that the most reliable 
technique for small samples is FEVD if time-invariant variables and the other variables 
are correlated with specific effects, which is likely to be the case in our study. 
Consequently, we use this technique for the empirical analysis. 
 
Next we provide more details of the alternative methods mentioned above, i.e. random 
effect estimator (REM), fixed effect estimator (FEM) and fixed effect vector 
decomposition (FEVD). 
  
4.1 Within Estimator and Random Estimator (FEM and REM)                
 
In the presence of correlation of the unobserved characteristics with some of the 
explanatory variables the random effect estimator leads to biased and inconsistent 
estimates of the parameters. To eliminate this correlation it is possible to use a traditional 
method called “within estimator or fixed effect estimator” which consists in transforming 
the data into deviations from individual means.  In this case, even if there is correlation 
between unobserved characteristics and some explanatory variables, the within estimator 
provides unbiased and consistent results. 
 
The fixed effect model can be written as 
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In the fixed effect transformation, the unobserved effect, αi, disappears, which yields 
unbiased and consistent results.  
 
The random model has the same form as before, 
  
Yit = â0 + â1xit1 + â2xit2 …………….. +âkxitk + ái + uit          (4) 
 
where an intercept is included so that the unobserved effect, ái, has a zero mean. Equation 
(4) becomes a random effect model when we assume that the unobserved effect ái is 
uncorrelated with each explanatory variable: 
 
Cov(xitk, ái) = 0, t = 1,2,…, T;  j =1,2,…, k.       (5) 
 
The Hausman χ2 test consists in testing the null hypothesis of no correlation between 
unobserved characteristics and some explanatory variables and allows us to make a 
choice between random estimator and within estimator. The within estimator has however 
two important limits:  
- it may not estimate the time-invariant variables that are eliminated by data 
transformation;  
- the fixed effect estimator ignores variations across individuals. The individual’s 
specificities can be correlated or not with the explanatory variable. In traditional methods 
these correlated variables are replaced with instrumental variables uncorrelated to 
unobservable characteristics.  
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4.2. Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD) 
 
Plümper and Troeger (2004) suggest an alternative to the estimation of time-invariant 
variables in the presence of unit effects. The alternative is the model discussed in Hsiao 
(2003). It is known that unit fixed effects are a vector of the mean effect of omitted 
variables, including the effect of time-invariant variables. It is therefore possible to 
regress the unit effects on the time-invariant variables to obtain approximate estimates for 
invariant variables. Plümper and Troeger (2004) propose a three-stage estimator, where 
the second stage only aims at the identification of the unobserved parts of the unit effects, 
and then uses the unexplained part to obtain unbiased pooled OLS (POLS) estimates of 
the time-varying and time-invariant variables only in the third stage. The unit effect 
vector is decomposed into two parts: a part explained by time-invariant variables and an 
unexplainable part (the error term). The model proposed by Plümper and Troeger (2004) 
yields unbiased and consistent estimates of the effect of time-varying variable and 
unbiased for time-invariant variables if the unexplained part of unit effects is uncorrelated 
with time-invariant variables.  
 
 This model has the robustness of fixed effect model and allows for the correlation 
between the time-variant explanatory variables and the unobserved individual effects. In 
brief, the fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD) proposed by Plümper and Troeger 
(2004) involves the three following steps:  
? estimation of the unit fixed effects by the FEM excluding the time-invariant 
explanatory variables;  
? regression of the fixed effect vector on the time-invariant variables of the original 
model (by OLS);  
? re-estimation of the original model by POLS, including all time-variant 
explanatory variables, time-invariant variables and the unexplained part of the fixed 
effect vector. The third stage is required to control for multicollinearity and to adjust the 
degrees of freedom5. 
                                                 
5 The program STATA proposed (ado-file) by the authors executes all three steps and adjusts the variance-
covariance matrix. Options like AR (1) error-correction and robust variance-covariance matrix are allowed. 
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 A general form of regression equation can be written as : 
 
itiitit ZXy εγβα +++=  (8) 
 where : 
             βXit = time-variant variable vector; 
             γZi    = time-invariant variable vector; 
  εit   = normal distributed error component; 
 
In the presence of unobserved time-invariant variables the equation (8) can be written as 
 
itiiitit uZXy εγβα ++++=   (9) 
 
where ui  = unobserved time-invariant variable whose unobserved effects are a random 
variable rather than an estimated parameter. 
 
The FEVD approach is implemented as follows.  
 
First step 
Recall the data generating process of equation (8). The within estimator quasi de-means 
the data and removes the individual effects ui: 
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The variance not used by the fixed effect estimator is most important.  
 
The unit effects are explained by: 
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where : 
 ηi is the unexplained part of the unit effects and iε  are the average unit means of the 
FEM estimation (indicating panel heteroskedasticity if iε  ≠ 0) 
 
Second step 
Given equation (11), it is simple to regress the on the z-variables. iuˆ
i
J
j
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where ω is the intercept of the stage 2 equation and ηi is the unexplained part of the unit 
effects as in equation (11). Equations (11) and (12) show that the exclusion of variables 
that are simultaneously correlated with the unit-effects  and the time-invariant 
variables z
iuˆ
i lead to biased estimates. In other words, the estimates are unbiased only if ηi 
≅ 0 for all i or if E( zi | ηi )=E(zi) = 0. 
 
Third step 
The full model is rerun without the unit effects but including the decomposed unit fixed 
effect vectors comprising  iηˆ  obtained in step 2. The third step is estimated by pooled 
OLS (or Prais-Winston in the presence of serial correlation). 
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 (13) 
By construction, iηˆ  is no longer correlated with the vector of the z’s. 
 
By including the error term of step 2 it is possible to account for individual specific 
effects that cannot be observed. The coefficient of iηˆ  is either equal to 1.0 or at least 
close to 1.0 (by accounting for serial correlation or panel heteroskedasticity) in step 3. 
Estimating stage 3 by pooled OLS further requires that heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation must be eliminated beforehand.  
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At least in theory this method has three obvious advantages  (see Plümper and Troeger, 
2004): 
a) the fixed effect vector decomposition does not require prior knowledge of the 
correlation between time-variant explanatory variables and unit specific effects,  
b) the estimator relies on the robustness of the within-transformation and does not need to 
meet the orthogonality assumptions (for time-variant variables) of random effects,  
c) FEVD estimator maintains the efficiency of POLS. 
 
Essentially FEVD produces unbiased estimates of time-varying variables, regardless of 
whether they are correlated with unit effects or not, and unbiased estimates of time-
invariant variables that are not correlated. The estimated coefficients of the time-
invariable variables correlated with unit effects, however, suffer from omitted variable 
bias. To summarise, FEVD produces less biased and more efficient coefficients. The 
main advantages of FEVD come from its lack of bias in estimating the coefficients of 
time-variant variables that are correlated with unit-effects.  
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1 The Econometric Model 
 
The econometric model we adopt in order to identify and to quantify the impact of the 
association agreement on trade flows between the EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries was 
chosen taking into account our sample data, the potential endogeneity of variable, the 
existence of unobservable bilateral characteristics which might or might not be correlated 
with the explanatory variables, and multicollinearity. 
 
Our econometric specification is the following: 
 
),......1;,......1()log(
)log()log()log()log()log(
65
43210
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==++++
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      (1) 
 
In this specification, the bilateral trade (Yijt) is the dependent variable. The explanatory 
variables used are the gross domestic product of the two partners (GDPit), (GDPjt), 
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geographic distance (Distij), the difference in development level (DGDPCijt), the real 
exchange rate (Tchrijt), the dichotomous variable association agreement (Accijt). 
The notation is the following: 
• Yijt denotes the bilateral trade between countries i and j at time t with i ≠ j 
(millions of dollars); 
• αo is the intercept; 
• GDPit, GDPjt represents the Gross Domestic Product of country i and country j  
(millions of dollars); 
• DGDPCijt  is the difference in GDP per capita between  partners and is a proxy of 
economic distance or of comparative advantage intensity, 
jt
jt
it
it
ijt N
GDP
N
GDPDGDPC −=        
             where  Ni(j)  is the population ; 
• Distij represents the distance  between country i and country j  (kilometers);  
• Tchrijt is the real exchange rate which indicates price competitiveness; 
jt
it
ijtijt P
PxTcnTchr =                                   
             where : Tcnijt is the nominal exchange rate;  
                           Pi (j) is the consumer price index; 
• Accijt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if country i and country j have signed 
a regional agreement, and zero otherwise; 
• uij is a bilateral specific effect (i = 1,2,…,N, j = 1,2,…,M) ; 
• θt is a time specific effect (t = 1,…..T); 
• εijt is the disturbance term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with a 
zero mean and a constant variance for all observations and to be uncorrelated. 
 
The source of data is the CHELEM – French CEPII data base for GDP, GDP/capita, 
nominal exchange rate and population; the CEPII data base for geographic distance; and 
the World Bank – World Tables for the consumer index price. The estimation period goes 
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from 1987 to 2005, i.e. 19 years for a sample of EU-156 and 4 CEEC countries7. We 
construct a panel with two dimensions: country pairs, and years. 
 
5.2 Estimation Results 
This section summarises the results from the estimation of the gravity model. We used 
panel data techniques for eliminating the endogeneity bias, and applied different panel 
data econometric methods such Fixed Effect Model (FEM), Random Effect Model 
(REM) and Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) in order to check the robustness 
of our estimates (see Table 1, 2, 3). 
 
Table 1 shows the impact of FTAs on trade flows. To establish whether the effect on the 
trade balance is symmetric or asymmetric, we estimate separately the effects on exports 
(Table 2) and imports (Table 3). The aggregate estimation indicates a positive effect of 
the association agreement variable on trade flows, in accordance with previous studies8. 
The coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected signs consistently with 
the gravity model: a positive effect on trade flows of country size and association 
agreement, and a negative impact of geographical distance and of real exchange rate. 
Moreover, the positive effect of the association agreement is found to be stronger after 
eliminating the endogeneity bias, the estimated coefficient being now close to 0.33 (see 
column 3,  Table 1). The coefficient of the European agreement variable decreases from 
0.37 (random effects model) to 0.33 in the fixed effects and FEVD model. Thus, there is 
clear evidence that the agreement has increased trade volume between EU-15 and CEEC-
4 countries.  
 
The association agreement appears to have had a positive but different impact on the 
CEEC-4 exports and imports towards the EU-15 countries. The coefficients are higher for 
imports (0.36) than for exports (0.21), indicating asymmetry. Concerning the trade 
                                                 
6 EU-15: Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, 
Ireland, Italy,  Portugal, Spain, Sweden. 
7 Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania. 
8 See for instance, Soloaga and Winters (2001), Carrère (2006), Cheng and Wall (2004), Rault and Sova 
(2007). 
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balance, we note that association leads to a trade deficit for the CEEC-4 with respect to 
the EU-15. Moreover, movements of the trade balance over time reveal that imports 
increase more quickly than exports (see Graph 1). Some potential explanations are: (i) the 
lack of product competitiveness in the European market, (ii) the increasing vertical FDI, 
importing intermediate goods necessary for their production process; (iii) a greater 
preference of consumers for products from the EU.  
 
Concerning robustness, the estimated coefficients are similar for FEM and FEVD; 
however, the latter not only enables us to isolate the endogeneity of the association 
agreement variable and to obtain unbiased coefficients, but also captures the effects of 
time-invariant variables on trade flows. 
 
The Fisher test suggests the introduction of effects (fixed or random) to improve the 
estimation results.  The estimated coefficients of the FEM are different from those 
obtained with the REM (for instance, association agreement) which can be explained by 
the existence of a correlation between some explanatory variables and the bilateral 
specific effect. Moreover, the Hausman test rejects the null assumption of no correlation 
between the individual effects and some explanatory variables for all estimations. This 
implies endogeneity bias, and therefore the fixed effects model is preferred. The 
Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity (F=160.26, P-value = 0.00), confirm the 
endogeneity of the FTA. We also calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) to ensure 
that multicollinearity does not affect the quality of estimates. In our all estimates, VIF did 
not exceed the threshold of 10, indicating that there is no multicollinearity9.  
 
Overall, the agreement variable coefficient indicates a positive and significant impact on 
trade flows but an asymmetric effect on exports and imports. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9  A variance inflation factor value higher than 10 reveals the presence of multicollinearity requiring 
specific corrections (see Gujarati, 1995).  
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has analysed the impact of association agreements on trade flows between the 
EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries treating the agreement variable as endogenous and using 
appropriate panel methods to estimate a gravity equation. The most relevant estimates are 
those provided by the FEVD estimation method which is the most appropriate for our 
purposes. This method permits to obtain unbiased coefficients and to capture the effects 
of time-invariant variables. As theory suggests, association agreements were found to 
have a positive and significant impact on trade flows between the participant countries. 
However, such effects appear to be asymmetric, the estimated coefficient being higher for 
imports (0.36) than for exports (0.21), which suggests trade asymmetry. In particular, the 
agreements resulted in increased trade deficits for the CEEC-4 countries (net importers), 
which is not desirable for economies still trying to catch up with the other EU states10. 
Convergent or divergent dynamics of imports and exports are the main cause of trade 
balance changes. The evolution of exports, imports as well as of trade balance over the 
estimation period for all CEEC-4 highlights the persistence and the deepening of the 
trade deficit (see Graphs 1 and 2). 
 
The lower impact of the agreement on CEEC-4 exports can be interpreted in terms of low 
EU demand for CEEC products reflecting their lack of attractiveness for European 
consumers, despite their price competitiveness based on comparative advantages due to 
lower labour costs. Trade liberalisation did not lead to a restructuring of exports and to a 
development of the most innovative sectors of the economy. Instead, CEEC-4 exports are 
still represented mainly by labour-intensive products with lower added value.11  
 
Higher trade openness and the progressive liberalisation of the capital flows resulting 
from the trade agreement have strongly influenced the behaviour of multinationals firms. 
Vertical FDI in the CEEC-4 countries has instead increased. This type of investment 
consists in the fragmentation of the various operations of the production process to 
                                                 
10 The trade balance is a component of GDP: a surplus increases GDP and a deficit reduces it. 
11 See Rault et al. (2007)  
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implement them in countries offering lower costs. The production location which results 
from it inevitably entails a rise of intermediate and equipments good imports of these 
countries from the investor’s countries. Thus, in the case of the CEEC-4 countries 
vertical FDI has induced a significant increase of intermediate and equipments good (and 
hence of total imports): these now represent more than half of the CEEC-4 countries total 
imports from the EU (see Graph 3). In order to reduce their trade deficit and to have a 
sustainable trade balance, the CEEC-4 countries would need instead more intra-branch 
trade with high added value products so as to increase their export competitiveness 
towards the EU and to attract horizontal FDI, thereby achieving real convergence.  
 
In conclusion, our estimation results indicate a positive and significant impact of FTAs 
on trade flows. However, exports and imports are affected differently, leading to some 
disparity in trade flow performance between countries. Therefore, there is an asymmetric 
impact on the trade balance, the agreement variable resulting in a trade balance deficit in 
the CEEC-4. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 – The impact of the association agreement on trade flows 
 
FEM REM FEVD 
xij xij xij
 
VARIABLE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GDPit  2.021 
(25.33)*** 
1.450 
(28.56)*** 
2.021 
(25.32)*** 
GDPjt 1.476 
(18.50)*** 
1.222 
(24.06)*** 
1.476 
(18.50)*** 
Distij 0.000 
(.) 
-1.340 
(10.56)*** 
-1.192 
(26.84)*** 
DGDPCijt 0.347 
(7.81)*** 
0.380 
(8.67)*** 
0.347 
(94.18)*** 
Tchrijt -0.042 
(11.49)*** 
-0.036 
(10.19)*** 
-0.042 
(3.47)*** 
Accijt 0.327 
(26.88)*** 
0.374 
(31.56)*** 
0.327 
(15.28)*** 
Residuals - 
 
- 
 
1.000 
(117.06)*** 
Constant -17.820 
(33.26)*** 
-9.417 
(15.76)*** 
-14.073 
(208.56)*** 
No. of observations 2128 2128 2128 
Number of groups 112 112 - 
R-squared 0.73 0.79 0.94 
Fischer test (F) 
Prob > F 
35.60 
(0.00) 
- - 
Hausman test (chi2) 
Prob>chi2 
- 225.39 
(0.00) 
- 
Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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 Table 2 - The impact of the association agreement on exports 
 
FEM REM FEVD 
xij xij xij
 
VARIABLE 
(1) (2) (3) 
GDPit  1.264 
(10.45)*** 
1.430 
(16.41)*** 
1.264 
(10.44)*** 
GDPjt 2.867 
(15.97)*** 
1.409 
(18.31)*** 
2.867 
(15.96)*** 
Distij 0.000 
(.) 
-1.200 
(6.73)*** 
-1.003 
(12.78)*** 
DGDPCijt -0.020 
(2.26)** 
0.321 
(4.93)*** 
-0.020 
(4.05)*** 
Tchrijt -0.019 
(3.79)*** 
-0.020 
(3.90)*** 
-0.019 
(2.02)** 
Accijt 0.211 
(11.23)*** 
0.314 
(18.96)*** 
0.211 
(7.23)*** 
Residuals - 
 
- 
 
1.000 
(137.14)*** 
Constant -19.940 
(26.24)*** 
-10.496 
(12.28)*** 
-16.788 
(182.58)*** 
No. of observations 1064 1064 1064 
Number of groups 56 56 - 
R-squared 0.72 0.81 0.94 
Fischer test (F) 
Prob > F 
33.62 
(0.00) 
- - 
Hausman test (chi2) 
Prob>chi2 
- 148.79 
(0.00) 
- 
Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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 Table 3 - The impact of the association agreement on imports    
 
FEM REM FEVD 
xij xij xij
 
VARIABLE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GDPit  2.515 
(13.93)*** 
1.265 
(17.71)*** 
2.515 
(13.92)*** 
GDPjt 1.004 
(8.25)*** 
1.098 
(12.97)*** 
1.004 
(8.25)*** 
Distij 0.000 
(.) 
-1.637 
(10.05)*** 
-1.505 
(19.07)*** 
DGDPCijt 0.100 
(2.27)** 
0.377 
(5.75)*** 
0.100 
(19.64)*** 
Tchrijt -0.068 
(13.47)*** 
-0.054 
(10.69)*** 
-0.068 
(3.62)*** 
Accijt 0.358 
(18.95)*** 
0.450 
(26.72)*** 
0.358 
(12.20)*** 
Residuals - 
 
- 
 
1.000 
(123.19)*** 
Constant -17.204 
(22.51)*** 
-6.885 
(8.46)*** 
-12.472 
(134.87)*** 
No. of observations 1064 1064 1064 
Number of groups 56 56 - 
R-squared 0.77 0.76 0.94 
Fischer test (F) 
Prob > F 
34.64 
(0.00) 
- - 
Hausman test (chi2) 
Prob>chi2 
- 510.25 
(0.00) 
- 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Graph.1.Evolution of trade balance for CEEC-4 with EU -15. 
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Data source : CHELEM – French CEPII data base. Calculations by the authors. 
 
Graph. 2.a - Evolution of exports, imports and trade balance of Romania with EU-15 
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Data source : CHELEM – French CEPII data base. Calculations by the authors. 
 
Graph.2.b. Evolution of exports, imports and trade balance of Poland with EU-15 
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Data source : CHELEM – French CEPII data base. Calculations by the authors. 
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Graph.2.c. Evolution of exports, imports and trade balance of Hungary with EU-15 
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Data source : CHELEM – French CEPII data base. Calculations by the authors. 
 
Graph.2.d. Evolution of exports, imports and trade balance of Bulgaria with EU-15 
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Data source : CHELEM – French CEPII data base. Calculations by the authors. 
 
Graph.3 – Imports of intermediate goods and equipment as a % of total imports, 2004 
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Data source : CHELEM – French CEPII data base. Calculations by the authors. 
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